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Abstract—Since the use of applications and communication 
tools has increased, one of the concerns of the responsible for 
network security has been to protect information and 
information systems, as well as to provide trust to end users for 
the use of information and communication technologies. 
Nowadays, attacks on the network have increased and 
undergone modifications, which make the task for traditional 
security devices difficult, being necessary to add the intelligence 
to face the new attacks generated in the network. Hence the need 
to incorporate Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) as a new 
component in the network. This work focuses on the use of 
information provided by a CTI to improve the security of 
Software Defined Networks (SDN), and at the same time, 
analyze how malicious traffic could be blocked in a physical 
testbed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A sustained annual growth of cyberattacks perpetrated 
worldwide, the greater complexity for the detection and 
subsequent mitigation of cyber-incidents, added to the shorter 
times for them to get a global reach; they are some of the main 
characteristics of the current context of cyberspace; all the 
aforementioned is reflected in the world economy, where the 
estimated amount lost, generated by cybercrimes for 2018, 
reached 600 billion dollars [1]. 
Having a panorama so complicated for Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERT / CSIRT), security 
officers and system administrators, it is essential to provide 
the greatest amount of resources and information necessary, 
so that they can identify and prevent threats to which your 
organization may be exposed. In this sense, CTI has emerged 
as added value that has been increasingly accepted and used 
by organizations for the detection of threats and attacks, 
response to incidents, vulnerability management, blocking of 
threats; organizations make use of relevant information by 
playing the role of consumer and/or data provider CTI [2]. 
Even more, it is added the inconveniences that 
characterize the management of a network based on the 
traditional model, where security policies must be 
implemented in the network devices (router, switches), even 
in middle boxes (firewall, IDS, IPS), which are configured 
through particular commands that differ between 
manufacturers. In such a way, this article presents the 
incorporation of CTI taking as test scenario an implementation 
on real hardware of a SDN, an emerging network architecture 
whose adoption in recent years has been growing considerably 
[3], which is characterized by the separation of the control and 
data planes located in the network devices, unifying and 
moving the logic of control to an entity that is called the SDN 
Controller, thus enabling the programmability of the network 
through the development of software-based applications, 
simplifying management and decreasing the probability of 
human error in the implementation or modification of security 
policies [4]. 
The following sections of this article are organized as 
follows: In Section II, we review theoretical information and 
the most relevant related works. In Section III, we describe 
our proposal. In section IV, we present and discuss the results. 
Finally, in Section V we show the conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUNG & RELATED WORKS 
In [5], the authors used CTI and an intrusion detection system 
(BroIDS), in order to provide a proactive solution; the counter 
measures for attacks and threats are converted into flow 
entries that are entered into the affected switches. 
Furthermore, if a new attack is detect, in addition to blocking 
it, it is redirected to a Honeypot for further analysis. This 
study does its test on a virtual scenario. In [6], the authors 
proposed a model that allows defending against cyber threats 
in SDN based on risk analysis, in order to be implemented in 
production environments. The model collects data from CTI 
TAXII servers, which is analyzed and those with lower 
reliability are filtered, then it is determined what actions to 
take in the SDN network in order to prevent attacks. This 
model is proved also on a virtual scenario. However, these 
two works do not contemplate a physical testbed and an 
efficient use of the flow tables of the SDN switches (pipeline 
process) for the flow entries that will be installed, since only 
use one flow table, so the packet will take more time to 
perform an action. 
A. Software Defined Network 
The Software Defined Networks (SDN) allow a 
centralized control of the network, since the data plane and the 
control plane are decoupled. The data plane is responsible for 
forwarding packets, while the control plane provides 
intelligence in the design of routes and Quality of Service 
(QoS), among other things, in order to cope with changing 
traffic patterns. The communication between the SDN 
controller (control plane) and the SDN switches (data plane) 
is given by the OpenFlow protocol using a secure channel. [7] 
B. OpenFlow 
The OpenFlow protocol allows the controller to manage 
the flow entries, these inputs have as main components the 
priority fields, matching fields, counters and a set of actions 
and instructions to be carried out with the matched packets. 
There are three types of OpenFlow messages: Controller-to-
Switch messages that allow the controller to manage the 
logical state of the switch, such as configuration and flow 
entries. Asynchronous messages used to inform the controller 
about changes in the network or the state of the switch. 
Symmetric messages are used when the connection is 
established for the first time, to measure the bandwidth, the 
status of a connection or to verify if the device is operational. 
In this work, OpenFlow protocol version 1.3.0 is used due to 
the support of the pipeline process, in which the process of 
matching search with an incoming packet is done by taking 
into account multiple OpenFlow tables. [8] 
C. Zodiac FX 
The Zodiac Fx switch was designed to be used for 
researchers and students who want to implement a software 
defined network in a laboratory environment. Developed by 
the company Northbound Networks, it supports versions 1.0 
and 1.3 of the OpenFlow protocol, it has four Ethernet ports, 
an USB port through which enters the command line interface, 
and also provides power for its operation and has an Amtel 
SAM4E8CA processor. [9] 
D. Cyber Threat Intelligence 
CTI collects information from reliable sources providing 
the ability to recognize suspicious and malicious activities, 
thus it helps making decisions to prevent damage to the 
organization. Initial surveys [10], showed the tendency of use 
and investment of resources for the implementation of 
solutions based on CTI. 
Nowadays, an increase in the acceptance and application 
of CTI in organizations is confirmed with documented 
requirements for its use and implementation of good practices 
[11]. However, still there are a wide variety of industries that 
claim not have them yet. 
The threat intelligence used is CIF (Collective Intelligence 
Framework), which obtains "feeds" type information from 
external and internal sources that can be shared among 
organizations. This information is characterized by being 
filtered from the observable type, which could be: IPv4, 
FQDN, URL, IPv6, email. 
III. PROPOSE DESIGN 
 
Fig. 1. Testbed Topology 
 
The proposed testbed is composed by five elements: the 
CIF server, SDN controller (OpendayLight), SDN 
application, OpenFlow switch (Zodiac FX) and the hosts. The 
CIF server and the SDN Controller each use a dedicated 
server. 
A. Network Topology 
For this testbed, a linear topology between the Zodiac FX 
(OF switch) is presented. The OpenFlow switch S1 will 
behave similar to the firewall where the OpenFlow rules from 
the information provided by the CIF will be inserted.  
Fig. 1 shows the topology with all the elements connected. 
The switches are connected to the controller, the 
FLOW_MOD messages represents the generated rules based 
on the information provided by the CIF, this information is 
distributed in multiple tables, which will be responsible for 
both incoming and outgoing packets. 
B. SDN Controller and Application 
The Opendaylight controller, developed in the Java 
programming language, is used in this article in its Oxygen-
SR2 version. In this work, we made use of the following 
features: 
 L2switch-all: Provides a behaviour of layer 2 switch 
to the Zodiac FX. 
 Dluxapps-applications: It provides a website where 
it shows the distribution of the nodes. 
 Restconf-all: Enables REST interfaces. 
We can distinguish two methods for the SDN applications 
development: 
 The development through the consume of the REST 
API interfaces exposed by the SDN controller, where 
the selection of programming language is 
independent of the selected SDN controller, only 
with support for making REST calls should be 
considered.  
 The development through the implementation of 
internal service modules MD-SAL, where the 
libraries and functions of each SDN controller are 
used, for which the selection of the programming 
language is conditioned to the chosen SDN 
Controller. 
The choice of one of them depends exclusively on the 
application to be implemented. For the development of the 
SDN application in this work, the first method has been 
selected, where the application is responsible for the creation 
of the OpenFlow flow entries based on Indicators of 
Compromise (IOC) provided by the CIF server, and the 
implementation of these inputs in the switch S1, that fulfills 
the function of edge switch for our experimental purposes. 
C. Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) 
The CIF v3, has been installed considering the technical 
specifications from TABLE I. The CIF periodically receives 
information reports of known attacks. The most common 
types of threat intelligence stored in CIF are the IP addresses, 
domains and URLs, that are observed as related to malicious 
activities [12], also in the reports, the type of attack is 
specified in some cases. For this proposal, the information 
obtained by the CIF is stored in a SQL database. After that, it 
is filtered because it is possible information is repeated. Once 
the information is filtered, it is stored in a table to be later used 
by the application, which through the controller, will be in 
charge of injecting OpenFlow flow entries that prevent known 
attacks. 
TABLE I. COMPONENTS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
Hostname 
Operating 
System 
Processor RAM 
CIF Server 
Ubuntu 
16.04.6 LTS 
2.40 GHz 64-bit 
Intel Xeon E5-2620 
188 GB 
Opendaylight 
Controller 
SDN   
Ubuntu 
16.04.3 LTS 
2.66 GHz Intel Core 
2 Quad Q8400 
 
 
 
8GB 
 
 
Hosts 
Ubuntu 
16.04.3 LTS 
2.10 GHz 64-bit 
Intel Core 2 Quad 
T8100 
  4GB  
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION & RESULTS 
Implemented the testbed, the SDN application is executed 
and three OpenFlow tables are generated, as shown in Fig. 2. 
Table 0, contains the OpenFlow flow entries that allow 
communication between hosts within the network. Table 1, 
contains the OpenFlow flow entries based on the information 
of CIF that allow to drop traffic whose destination is 
malicious. Finally, in the Table 2 contains the flow entries 
based on the information of CIF that allow to drop traffic 
whose source is malicious. 
 
Fig. 2 Flow tables representation. 
For communication between hosts, according to Fig. 1, it 
does not involve switch S1. The packets, whose origin and 
destination belong to hosts within the same network, arrive at 
the switch and start at Table 0, which contains flow entries 
that will indicate which route should packet follow. 
In case is required that a host is connect to Internet, the 
process now involves switch S1. If packets have the gateway 
as first hop, exists a flow entry in Table 0 of switch S1, which 
forwards the packets to the Table 1. This table has the flow 
entries generated by the information provided by the CIF, 
which have a high priority to ensure that the packets do not 
make a match with a general rule. The packets makes a sweep 
of all those flow entries that contain malicious IPs. If there is 
a match, the packets will be drop; otherwise, the packets will 
follow its normal course towards the gateway that will 
generate its subsequent Internet access. 
In case the packets come from Internet to the internal 
network, the process is similar to the previous one but in an 
inverse way. The packets arrive from the gateway to switch 
S1. If the packets have as origin the gateway MAC address, 
there is a flow entry that indicates them go to Table 2.  
In Table 2 there are flow entries generated by the 
information provided by the CIF, which has a high priority to 
ensure that packets do not make a match with a general flow 
entry. The packets makes a sweep by all the flow entries and 
in case of coinciding with a malicious IP, they will be drop. In 
case they do not coincide with any IP, they will be forward 
towards the internal network. 
In this case, we execute the application that will generate 
three tables, as shown in Fig 3. We see that in this case, 44 
flow entries are generated in Table 1 and Table 2, which are 
the tables containing information from CIF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Generated Flow tables. 
The flows generated in Table 0 are those that allow 
communication between hosts of the same LAN and at the 
same time provide the necessary rules to communicate to and 
from Internet. If the communication goes to or comes from 
Internet, the packets go to Table 1 or Table 2 respectively. 
To verify the operation, we test connectivity from a host 
to a malicious IP using the ping command, whose rule contain 
the malicious IP in the Match field and the instruction drop in 
the Action field. It is observed that initially the flow entry has 
the parameters Packet Count and Byte Count equal to 0, as 
shown in Fig 4. 
 
Fig. 4 Initial values flow 95. 
Using the ping command, we generate 1000 packets 
towards the malicious IP (it is omitted). In Fig. 5, it is seen that 
there is a 100% packet loss, which indicates that no connection 
could be established. 
 
Fig. 5 Failed connectivity test due to the flow entry. 
In addition, Fig. 6 shows that the flows statistics have 
changed, showing now that Packet Count is equal to 1000 and 
Byte Count is equal to 98000. In that way, we can notice that 
in case some type of traffic comes from a malicious IP or 
going to it, this will be blocked by the flow entry on switch 
S1. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Flow entry after connectivity test. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents a case of use of cyber incidents reports 
obtained through the CTI management platform (CIF). The 
data network was programmed through the successful 
development of an SDN application using Python language, 
which translates the incident reports into OpenFlow flow 
entries to be inserted in the table corresponding of OpenFlow 
switch when the pipeline process is enabled. The testbed was 
made up of OpenFlow switches for domestic use, which are 
not designed to work in a production environment, due to the 
limited number of ports available, however this did not mean 
an impediment to be able to carry out the validation process 
successfully.  
As future work, we propose to add the classification 
mechanisms of incident records obtained from internal 
elements of a network, in order to obtain the threat intelligence 
lifecycle. 
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